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Executive Summary
This report investigates the design of optimal cybersecurity policies. Our analysis focuses on
incentives and explores how regulations can bring the private decisions of prot-maximising
rms into line with the objectives of society as a whole. In so doing, we pay explicit attention
to important regulatory interactions between cybersecurity, data privacy and competition.
This is a crucial part of evaluating the welfare-desirability of any cybersecurity policy: in order
to maximise social welfare, regulation must not only correct market failures in the area of
cybersecurity but, at the same time, avoid exacerbating market failures in the related areas of
data privacy and competition. These areas are intuitively closely connected since the sensitive
consumer data that a rm’s cybersecurity strategy aims to protect are simultaneously the
subject of data sharing agreements between rms (the data privacy issue) and the source of
market power for dominant rms in several important sectors (the competition issue).
We approach this question from several methodological directions. Firstly, we discuss the
extent to which the UK’s existing regulatory framework accounts for relevant interactions.
Secondly, we conduct a qualitative analysis of this regulatory landscape, drawing on primary
data collected from interviews and workshops. Thirdly, we begin our evaluation of the policy
recommendations that emerge from these interviews and workshops by reviewing the ex-
isting literature in the area of cybersecurity regulation. Finally, we extend the literature by
presenting the results of two original theoretical contributions that, for the rst time, incor-
porate regulatory interactions into the analysis of cybersecurity regulations.
These theoretical results allow us to evaluate in more detail the various policy recommen-
dations that are highlighted by our qualitative analysis. In particular, they suggest that a more
prescriptive approach to cybersecurity and data privacy regulation may be needed, and that
cybersecurity concerns need to be closely integrated into any competition remedies that are
based on compulsory data sharing by dominant rms. The report closes with an overview of
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The importance of protecting society from online threats is highlighted by the rising cost
of cyber-attacks.
1
Cyber-crimes such as espionage, ransomware attacks and nancial crime
entail not only direct monetary harm but also non-monetary damages in the form of system
downtime, reduced eciency and brand damage. Protecting rms and consumers from these
costs relies on the availability of eective technological defences, but also on the incentives
of rms to develop and implement these new technologies, and of consumers to adopt secure
behaviours with respect to their personal data.
This project takes an economic approach to studying cybersecurity that focuses on incen-
tives. In this context, the motivation for regulation arises whenever the private incentives that
the market provides for rms and consumers fail to achieve the goals that society as a whole
sets for itself. Market failures of this type are common whenever choices are made by private
agents such as prot-maximising rms who do not base their decisions on a consideration of
social welfare, which considers not only rm prots but also the well-being of consumers.
Optimal cybersecurity policies align rms’ cybersecurity decisions with those that society
as a whole prefers. If rms’ cybersecurity choices are separate from the remaining aspects of
their business strategy, this problem can be viewed in isolation. Typically, however, rms’
decisions are interrelated, so that altering a rm’s incentives in one dimension, albeit with a
view to correcting a market failure, can have unintended welfare consequences if it exacer-
bates market failures in another dimension.
Interactions of this type are likely to play a signicant role in the context of cybersecurity.
This is the case because the sensitive data that cybersecurity seeks to protect are, at the same
time, the subject of data sharing agreements between rms (the data privacy issue) and also
1
See Federal Bureau of Investigation (2020); McAfee (2020). The methodology underlying the calculation of
cyber-damages is not the focus of this report, but is discussed in DCMS (2020a).
6
7
underlie the dominant market position enjoyed by many banks, search engines, online retail-
ers and social media platforms, among others (the competition issue). Our focus on regulatory
interactions reects our objective to incorporate these important relationships between rms’
incentives in the cybersecurity, data privacy and competition domains in our investigation of
optimal cybersecurity policies.
For the sake of a clear separation between cybersecurity and data privacy, in what fol-
lows, we consider cybersecurity to relate to measures seeking to prevent the unintentional
dissemination of data through the economy that occurs as a result of a cyber-attack, while
data privacy relates to the intentional dissemination of data that occurs when data control-
ling rms agree to share data with third parties.
2
In this report, we approach the analysis of regulatory interactions and optimal cybersecu-
rity policies from several methodological directions. Firstly, we review the existing regulatory
framework in the UK and discuss the extent to which relevant interactions are already taken
into account. We nd that this is true to a limited extent, but that important open questions
remain in terms of whether cybersecurity and data privacy objectives are co-ordinated suf-
ciently, and whether cybersecurity and competition objectives merit closer integration, for
example in the context of Open Baking.
Secondly, we evaluate the UK framework of digital security regulation by drawing on pri-
mary data collected through interviews and workshops. The input collected through these
interactions provides an overview of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats
that market participants representing a broad range of professional backgrounds identied in
relation to the current system of regulations. Our interviews and workshops also enable us to
present a range of specic policy recommendations concerning the future of UK digital secu-
rity. The types of questions that these policy recommendations address include, for instance,
whether a centralised or decentralised approach is likely to be most eective.
Given the large number of policies that were suggested by our interview and workshop
participants, it is important to have an objective basis for evaluating the desirability of al-
ternative reform proposals. Economic modelling oers the opportunity to study the welfare
consequences of alternative policy reforms in isolation of conating factors. To that end, our
third methodology consists of a review of the academic literature and technical reports in
the area of cybersecurity regulation. A number of important contributions in the elds of
economics and management demonstrate the value that a theoretical understanding of reg-
ulations can have. These relate, for example, to the optimal balance between investments to
2
This is in keeping with the UK Data Sharing Code of Practice, for example, which denes privacy information
as the “information that organisations need to provide to individual data subjects about the collection and use
[i.e. transfer] of their data”.
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prevent and mitigate the damage of cyber-attacks.
This review of the existing literature also highlights that the cybersecurity problem has,
so far, been studied in isolation of the data privacy and competition issues. To address this
gap in the literature, we present the results of two original contributions that, to the best
of our knowledge, are the rst to account explicitly for regulatory interactions. This game-
theoretic modelling work represents the fourth of our methodological approaches. Relating
the conclusions of this work back to the input we collected through interviews and workshops,
we are able to demonstrate the precise sense in which regulatory co-ordination is needed:
regulations such as minimum security standards that unilaterally target cybersecurity can
have unintended welfare consequences if rms’ decisions in the areas of data privacy are left
to be determined by market forces. Moreover, introducing competition can introduce new
market failures in the area of cybersecurity.
On the basis of this theoretical work, we draw several policy conclusions with relevance
to the UK framework of digital security regulation. In particular, we suggest that a more
prescriptive approach to regulation may be needed, and that any pro-competitive measures
based on compulsory data sharing, such as Open Banking, should have cybersecurity as a joint
objective. Nonetheless, not all the open questions that are raised by our review of existing
regulations, our primary data analysis and our review of the existing literature are answered
by this work. We therefore also present an overview of some important open questions for
research.
The report is structured as follows. Part 2 reviews the existing framework of digital secu-
rity regulation in the UK. Part 3 presents our qualitative analysis of these regulations, draw-
ing on primary data collected through interviews and workshops. Part 4 reviews the existing
academic literature and technical reports, before Part 5 discusses our original game-theoretic
modelling work. Part 6 discusses future research directions. Conclusions are presented in
Part 7.
Part 2
The UK Regulatory Landscape
There is no single law governing rms’ cybersecurity choices.
1
Instead they fall under a vari-
ety of legislative instruments that either target cybersecurity in a more limited sense, or that
have other objectives such as national security or sectoral regulation as their primary goal.
The approach of these regulations is broadly principles-based rather than prescriptive.
This is designed to give the law the exibility to keep up with the evolving nature of technol-
ogy and cyber-threats. These regulations also do not intend to make rms immune to cyber-
attack, the associated costs generally being seen as unsupportable. Instead, the appropriate
level of cybersecurity is governed by a balancing exercise between the costs of implementing
a given level of cybersecurity and its benets in terms of preventing cyber-attacks.
We rst discuss the central elements of the UK regulatory framework for digital secu-
rity: the UK GDPR, the Data Protection Act 2018 and the Network and Information Systems
Regulations 2018. We then discuss a number of other relevant pieces of legislation.
2.1 Data Protection Act (2018) and the UK GDPR
The General Data Protection Regulation ((EU) 2016/679) (GDPR) governs the manner in which
personal data is collected, shared or otherwise processed. It does so by dening a series of
rights held by data subjects and by imposing obligations on controllers and processors.
2
Although the GDPR has applied directly in EU member states since May 2018, its principles
were also incorporated into UK law via the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018). As such, the
DPA 2018 ensures that EU and UK data protection laws will remain aligned post-Brexit, at least
1
This part draws on practice notes maintained by Practical Law and Lexis PSL.
2
A controller decides on the manner in which data is processed. A processor is a separate legal entity from a
controller that acts entirely under instruction from the controller with respect to data processing activities.
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until such a time as EU or UK laws are amended. The DPA 2018 also goes beyond the GDPR
in some areas, for example concerning the processing of personal data by law enforcement
and intelligence organisations, and it sets out specic UK exemptions. Following Brexit, the
GDPR has become part of the body of retained EU law and is referred to as the UK GDPR. The
GDPR itself is therefore now referred to as the EU GDPR in the UK. The UK GDPR and DPA
2018 represent the principal pieces of data protection legislation in the UK.
The obligations of controllers are summarised in six data protection principles contained
in the UK GDPR. Controllers are responsible for ensuring compliance with each of them (the
accountability principle). Of these data protection principles, the sixth relates directly to cy-
bersecurity. It states that data should be
“processed in a manner that ensures appropriate security of the personal data, in-
cluding protection against unauthorised or unlawful processing and against acci-
dental loss, destruction or damage, using appropriate technical or organisational
measures (‘integrity and condentiality’).”
Article 5(1)(f), UK GDPR, emphasis added
The balancing of risks against rewards in determining the appropriate level of cybersecu-
rity is made explicit in Article 32:
“Taking into account the state of the art, the costs of implementation and the na-
ture, scope, context and purposes of processing as well as the risk of varying like-
lihood and severity for the rights and freedoms of natural persons, the controller
and the processor shall implement appropriate technical and organisational mea-
sures to ensure a level of security appropriate to the risk.”
Article 32(1), UK GDPR, emphasis added
As this Article also states, the measures businesses are required to take in order to com-
ply with the security principle include those of a technical nature (e.g. rewalls and threat-
detection software) and an organisational nature (e.g. training, policies and procedures).
Other provisions of the UK GDPR can be seen as imposing additional cybersecurity re-
quirements on rms. In particular:
1. data shall be “kept in a form which permits identication of data subjects for no longer





Another security-related context that builds on this principle is the Payment Card Industry Data Security
Standard (PCI DSS), applicable to merchants and payment processors, which prohibits storing payment card
verication codes once a transaction has been authorised (Rule 3.2.2, PCI DSS v3).
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2. the processing of personal data undertaken by controllers should build on the data pro-
tection by design and default principle (Article 25, UK GDPR).
These security principles are enforced by the Information Commissioner’s Oce (ICO).
Any incident leading to a breach of personal data must be notied to the ICO within 72 hours
of the controller becoming aware of it, where feasible (Article 32(1), UK GDPR). Similarly,
processors must inform their controller without undue delay following a cyber-breach (Article
33(2), UK GDPR).
Enforcement powers held by the ICO include information notices (requests for informa-
tion), assessment notices (inspections to determine compliance with legislation), enforcement
notices (requiring a controller or processor to take a particular action) and penalty notices. In
the case of the latter, failure to ensure appropriate security measures can result in nes of up
to the greater of £17.5 million or 4% of annual global turnover (Article 83(5), UK GDPR). The
ICO may take enforcement action, even without a data breach having occurred. In practice,
reputational costs and private actions for damages are likely to represent further incentives
to ensure appropriate levels of cybersecurity.
2.2 Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018
The Network and Information Systems Regulations 2018 (SI 2018/506) (NIS Regulations) are
the UK enactment of the Network and Information Security Directive ((EU) 2016/1148) (Cyber-
security Directive). These regulations impose a number of cybersecurity-related obligations
on two classes of rms:
1. Operators of essential services (OESs): rms that operate in important sectors such
as energy, transport, health and digital, and which rely on network and information
systems to perform their economic role.
2. Relevant digital service providers (RDSPs): rms that provide certain types of digital
services in the UK, including online marketplaces, search engines and cloud computing
services.
In contrast to the Cybersecurity Directive, banking and nancial market infrastructures are
not covered by the NIS Regulations. These areas are instead monitored by the Financial Con-
duct Authority (FCA) (see Cybersecurity in the Financial Services Sector below).
In each case, threshold requirements in terms of rm size must be met in order for an OES
or RDSP to fall within the scope of the NIS Regulations. For OESs, and depending on the sector
12
in which they operate, these requirements are set out in Schedule 2 to the NIS Regulations.
For RDSPs, small and micro businesses are generally exempted. OESs and RDSPs are required
to self-identify to their designated competent authority. The designated competent authority
varies for OESs according to the sector of their operations as reected in Schedule 1 to the
NIS Regulations. All RDSPs are subject to the oversight of the ICO.
Unlike the GDPR and DPA 2018, the focus of the NIS Regulations is not the security of the
data being processed, but rather the security of the information technology (IT) infrastructure
on which the essential services provided by OESs and RDSPs rely. OESs and RDSPs satisfying
the threshold requirements fall under the NIS Regulations precisely because outages of the
networks and systems they control could lead to substantial damage to consumers and the
wider economy.
The main security obligations of OESs under the NIS Regulations are to:
(1) “take appropriate and proportionate technical and organisational measures to
manage risks posed to the security of the network and information systems
on which their essential service relies.
(2) take appropriate and proportionate measures to prevent and minimise the im-
pact of incidents aecting the security of the network and information systems
used for the provision of an essential service, with a view to ensuring the
continuity of those services.”
Regulation 10, NIS Regulations, emphasis added
The measures adopted under (1) must “ensure a level of security of network and information
systems appropriate to the risk posed” (Regulation 10(3)). An important dierence to the UK
GDPR lies in the fact that OESs (and RDSPs) may not take the cost of implementing cyberse-
curity measures into account when deciding on their appropriateness. Rather appropriateness
in the context of the NIS Regulations is based on the “state of the art”, that is the measures
currently available to them.
With regard to RDSPs, the security requirements are somewhat lighter than for OESs.
Services provided by RDSPs are typically less critical to the continued normal operation of the
wider economy. An “RDSP must identify and take appropriate and proportionate measures to
manage the risks posed to the security of network and information systems on which it relies
to provide” (Regulation 12(1)). These measures must “(having regard to the state of the art)
ensure a level of security of network and information systems appropriate to the risk posed”
(Regulation 12(2)).
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The reporting obligations under the NIS Regulations are similar to those under the UK
GDPR. An OES or RDSP must notify its designated competent authority without delay and
no later than 72 hours after becoming aware of a security breach that has a signicant impact
on the continuity of the service which the OES or RDSP provides (Regulations 11, 12). It is
important to note, in contrast to the UK GDPR, the absence of the phrase “where feasible” in
this notication provision.
Enforcement of the NIS Regulations with respect to OESs falls to distinct and sector-
specic designated competent authorities, such as Ofcom in the case of digital infrastruc-
ture. The ICO is the competent authority for all RDSPs. Fines under the NIS Regulations are
not linked to global annual turnover, but instead follow tiered, static, upper limits depend-
ing on the infringement up to a maximum of £17 million. The possibility of double jeopardy,
whereby an organisation is ned under both the UK GDPR and the NIS Regulations for the
same event, is not ruled out. Other enforcement powers of designated competent authorities
include information notices, inspections and enforcement notices.
NIS Regulations & Supply Chains
The NIS Regulations push cybersecurity through the supply chain. In particular, the OES
or RDSP is held responsible for security, even if the delivery of its services is delegated to
third parties. This implies contractual arrangements will typically be in place between OESs,
RDSPs and third parties, covering, for example, auditing rights and a duty to report security
incidents promptly. The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has published supply chain
security guidance comprising 12 principles to help rms manage the security of their supply
chains.
4
Since the UK GDPR and DPA 2018 already require controllers to put in place min-
imum contractual obligations on processors,
5
these aspects of the UK GDPR, DPA 2018 and
NIS Regulations relating to supply chains should be seen as mutually reinforcing.
2.3 Other Legislation
Communications Act 2003
Section 105 of the Communications Act 2013 (CA 2013) concerns the security of public elec-
tronic communications networks and services. These terms describe, respectively, “an elec-
4
This guidance is accessible at https://www.ncsc.gov.uk/collection/ supply-chain-security.
5
See further https:// ico.org.uk/ for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/guide-to-the-general-data-
protection-regulation-gdpr/accountability-and-governance/contracts/ .
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tronic communications network provided wholly or mainly for the purpose of making elec-
tronic communications services available to members of the public” and “any electronic com-
munications service that is provided so as to be available for use by members of the public”
(Section 151). Providers of public electronic communications networks and services “must
take technical and organisational measures appropriately to manage risks to the security of
public electronic communications networks and public electronic communications services”
(Section 105A). They must also inform Ofcom of any security breaches having a signicant
impact on the operation and availability of those networks and services (Section 105A).
Privacy and Electronic Communications Regulations 2003
The Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (PECR)
6
imple-
ment the European e-Privacy Directive (2002/58/EC) into UK law. The PECR imposes obli-
gations on providers of public electronic communications services that mirror those under
Article 4 of the e-Privacy Directive. In particular, providers must “take appropriate technical
and organisational measures to safeguard the security of that service” (Regulation 5(1)). The
appropriateness criterion is satised in this context “if, having regard to (a) the state of tech-
nological developments, and (b) the cost of implementing it, [a measure] is proportionate to
the risks against which it would safeguard” (Regulation 5(4)).
Enforcement of the PECR lies in the hands of the ICO. Security breaches must be notied
“without undue delay” (Regulation 5A(1)), although this notication requirement disappears
if data has been adequately encrypted (Regulation 5A(6)(a)). Enforcement powers of the ICO
include audits and enforcement notices, as well as nes of up to £500,000.
Computer Misuse Act 1990
The Computer Misuse Act 1990 diers from the above legislation in that it denes a num-
ber of cyber-crimes that hackers may commit, rather than imposing security obligations on
data processing rms or operators of critical networks and services. Crimes covered by the
Computer Misuse Act 1990 include unauthorised access or interference with a computer, dis-
tributed denial of service attacks and the creation of hacking tools. The Computer Misuse Act
1990 has subsequently been amended by the Serious Crime Act 2015, which created the new
oence of impairing a computer such as to cause serious damage.
6
As amended by the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) (Amendment) Regulations 2011
(SI 2011/1208).
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Cybersecurity in the Financial Services Sector
Providers of nancial services including banks, insurance companies and nancial advisers
are subject to sector-specic cybersecurity regulations that are enforced by the FCA. These
cyber-regulations stem from two sources: the Principles for Business and the Senior Manage-
ment Arrangements, Systems and Controls (SYSC), both of which are contained in the FCA
Handbook.
The SYSC are responsibility standards for company directors and senior management in
nancial rms. They contain rules that were previously part of the Capital Markets Directive
(2006/49/EC) and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (2004/39/EC). Some of these
rules directly or indirectly impose cybersecurity requirements on nancial rms, in particular
insofar as they relate to securing systems, managing risks, reducing the risk of nancial crime
and ensuring customer condentiality. For instance, SYSC 3.2.21 states that “a rm should
have appropriate systems and controls in place to full the rm’s regulatory and statutory
obligations with respect to adequacy, access, periods of retention and security of records.”
These requirements also relate explicitly to the security of data that is transmitted: “a common
platform rm
7
must have sound security mechanisms in place [...] to guarantee the security
and authentication of the means of transfer of information” (SYSC 4.1.1). Other relevant SYSC
rules include SYSC 6.1 (Compliance), SYSC 7 (Risk control) and SYSC 8 (Outsourcing).
Similarly, the third Principle for Business (PRIN 2.1.1, FCA Handbook) requires a rm
to “take reasonable care to organise and control its aairs responsibly and eectively, with
adequate risk management systems.” Under Principle 11, regulated rms have a duty to report
cyber-attacks to the FCA. A similar requirement also exists under Rule 7 of the Prudential
Regulation Authority Rulebook.
European Regulation with Extraterritorial Eect in the UK
Post-Brexit, the EU GDPR will continue to aect UK businesses that are controllers or proces-
sors and that have an establishment in the EU, that oer goods or services to EU data subjects,
or that monitor the behaviour of EU data subjects (Article 3, EU GDPR). UK rms may also be
subject to member state enforcement of the Cybersecurity Directive (EU) 2016/1148. This may
involve UK digital service providers having to comply with additional registration, security
and notication requirements in those EU markets in which they operate.
7
This term describes rms, such as banks, building societies and designated investment rms, which were
simultaneously subject to the Capital Markets Directive and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive.
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2.4 Open Questions
The preceding review allows us to draw preliminary conclusions about the extent to which UK
regulations incorporate relevant interactions between cybersecurity, data privacy and compe-
tition. First and foremost, the security principle contained in the UK GDPR and the DPA 2018
applies to all data processing activities, including data transfers. It requires processors to put
in place security measures that are appropriate, given the risks associated with the processing
activity. This should make the level of cybersecurity that rms implement responsive to the
cyber-risks associated with data sharing. The Information Commissioner’s Oce Data Shar-
ing Code of Practice makes this dependence explicit by providing specic guidance on how
to manage and mitigate risks when sharing data. From an international perspective, Chapter
V of the UK GDPR restricts the lawful bases for data to be transferred outside the UK. These
data transfers are restricted precisely because of concerns over the level of cyber-protection
in third countries (Article 45(2)(a), UK GDPR).
Other aspects of the UK regulatory framework discussed above link data privacy and cy-
bersecurity by addressing the security of the networks via which data is transmitted. The
NIS Regulations impose security obligations on OESs in the digital infrastructure and other
sectors, and on RDSPs such as online marketplaces and cloud computing services. The PECR
imposes similar duties on providers of public electronic communication services, who must
ensure the security of data that is stored or transmitted (Regulation 5(1A)(b)). Both regulations
stipulate security measures that are appropriate to the level of risk.
The principal question that emerges here is whether these provisions are sucient to
achieve socially desirable cybersecurity and data privacy outcomes. This is a question that
we address from a variety of perspectives in the remainder of the report, starting with an
analysis of primary data drawn from interviews and workshops in Part 3.
From a competition perspective, it is apparent that none of the regulations discussed above
explicitly account for the competitive eects that adherence to these rules entails. The main
source of concern that emerges in this context is that data sharing is often imposed as a
means of promoting competition, for example under Open Banking. It is important to consider
the extent to which the pro-competitive eects of such policies need to be balanced against
security and privacy goals. Greater co-ordination between cybersecurity, data privacy and
competition may be achieved, either by incorporating competition concerns into the above
system of digital security regulations, or by incorporating a data protection objective into
competition policy. This is an issue that we return to in detail in Part 5.2.
Part 3
Primary Data Analysis
We begin our evaluation of cybersecurity regulations in the UK and, in particular, their eec-
tiveness in addressing interactions between security, privacy and competition by reviewing
the primary data that was collected as part of this project via stakeholder interviews and
workshops. Part 3.1 describes the nature of this primary data. A SWOT analysis of the ex-
isting regime of digital security regulation in the UK is presented in Part 3.2, before Part 3.3
discusses a range of policy recommendations that emerged from our interviews and work-
shops. We reect on the open questions remaining after this qualitative analysis in Part 3.4.
3.1 Primary Data Collection
Primary data was collected via interviews and online workshops. We conducted ten structured
interviews of c.1 hour duration with interview subjects representing a range of professional
backgrounds, as summarised in Table 1 below.
Interviewee Area of Work Number
Regulator & Government-linked 1
Law Enforcement 2
Legal & Security Advisers 5
Private Enterprise 2
Total Interviews 10
Table 1: Interview Data Collection
In each interview, we asked interviewees to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the
existing regulatory framework, and to identify the most signicant challenges and opportu-
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nities connected with the promotion of digital security in the UK. We also invited interview
participants to address directly the importance that should be attached to interactions between
cybersecurity, data privacy and competition in designing more eective regulations.
Three online workshops were held on the topics of “Regulatory Interactions and the De-
sign of Optimal Cybersecurity Policies” (April 2021), “Considerations in the Design of Cyber-
security Policies” (June 2021) and “Competition and Digital Security Regulation” (July 2021).
The typical format for these events consisted of a panel of speakers, whose opening remarks
were followed by discussion and Q&A with audience members. Our workshops were attended
by a total of 36 participants representing academia and private sector research, regulation, law
enforcement, nancial services, SMEs and start-ups, legal, IT and information security con-
sultancy.
3.2 Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats
The strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats highlighted by our interviewees in con-
nection with the UK framework of digital security regulation are summarised as follows.
• The human factor: consumers lack 
awareness and knowledge & employees 
are vulnerable to psychological 
manipulation
• Lack of budget, planning and 
awareness, especially for SMEs
• Risk-based approach lacks transparency
• International co-operation
• Better defining liabilities and securing 
the supply chain
• Auditing and enforcement
• Ensuring trust, privacy and security in 
autonomous systems and AI
• Compliance costs and compatibility
• Reliance on lay advice 
• System complexity, uncertainties and 
zero day threats
• Enforcement issues around cost, 
consistency and transparency
• NCSC and Government offer good 
advice
• GDPR requirements for risk 




Figure 1: Summary of SWOT Analysis
Strengths
The NCSC was highlighted as a strength, particularly in connection with the clarity of the ad-
vice it provides to market participants. More broadly, the risk-based approach of the UK GDPR,
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as reected in the appropriateness criterion, was viewed favourably by interview participants.
Weaknesses
The human factor was highlighted as a major weakness. Many issues around cybersecurity
cannot be resolved technologically. Individuals may lack knowledge and awareness of cyber-
risks and may not be savvy enough to follow best-practice.
1
For instance, they may be reluc-
tant to change habits and may struggle to form accurate perceptions about their exposure to
risk. Individuals can also be targets of psychological manipulation.
Particularly for SMEs, a lack of planning and limited budgets can prevent higher stan-
dards of security being implemented. Investments in cybersecurity are often neglected in a
company’s business plan on the basis that they oer little perceived return, resulting in cy-
bersecurity becoming a priority only after a breach has occurred. Meeting standards such as
ISO 27001 can involve hiring an additional sta member for many SMEs, with signicant cost
implications. Nonetheless, oering self-certication schemes free of charge has led to little
increase in uptake in the past, suggesting a lack of awareness remains a signicant issue for
small rms.
While larger corporations are likely to have a dedicated legal function, expertise in the area
of data protection specically may nonetheless be lacking.
The risk-based approach to cybersecurity also has drawbacks in terms of transparency.
For example, it may not be clear what precise measures have been implemented under self-
assessment schemes such as Cyber Essentials. Moreover, the risk-based approach can be con-
fusing for people, and the accurate assessment of risks is challenging.
Opportunities
Several means of improving outcomes within the current regulatory regime were suggested.
Firstly, increased international co-operation was seen as a means of speeding up investigations
into cyber-attacks. Secondly, a clearer denition of liabilities would allow rms to factor cyber-
risks into their decision making more easily. Cases of invoice hijacking illustrate the dicult
questions courts face in assigning liability in complex cases.
There are also signicant opportunities for pushing cybersecurity through the supply chain.
For example, this may happen by increasing awareness of required contractual terms under
1
This also supports the Data & Marketing Association (DMA), according to whom “[t]he proportion of UK
society who show little or no concern with the issue of digital privacy or data exchange has increased from
16% of the population in 2012 to 25% [in 2017]” (DMA, 2018). Deloitte (2020) found that the proportion of UK
consumers who were “very concerned” about the use of their data halved from 47% in 2018 to 24% in 2020.
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the GDPR, or by ensuring that unregulated entities operate in close enough proximity to
regulated entities, as in Open Banking.
There is potential for regulators to strengthen the auditing and enforcement process. In
addition, making government-approved security resources and guidance about best-practice
more readily available could improve digital security outcomes.
Finally, there are signicant opportunities around automation and the use of Articial In-
telligence (AI) technologies, which can improve security by recognising behavioural traits of
users. This requires privacy and security concerns to be addressed, in particular the fact that
the same technology can also be used to malign ends, for example by impersonating individual
users.
Threats
The most signicant threat to the more widespread adoption of hardware and software se-
curity is cost. Security features remain optional add-ins rather than default settings in many
contexts such as cloud computing services. Uncertainty about the benets of cybersecurity
often leads to such options not being implemented on cost grounds. This is reected in rela-
tively low shares of cybersecurity in total business costs: these were estimated by interviewees
at c.0.75% for manufacturing and retail, rising to c.1-2.5% for nancial services and c.5% for
dedicated security advisory rms.
2
Costs of updating old systems and compatibility between
legacy systems and new technology are further threats.
On the enforcement side, consistency on the part of regulators as to which data breaches
are investigated has been lacking. Transparency of investigation outcomes is also problematic,
since any detected gaps in security protection cannot be too widely disclosed. This applies in
connection with the FCA’s CBEST testing, for example. Delays in introducing legislation to
address new cyber-risks as well as the slow pace of co-operation across international juris-
dictions represent additional threats.
Finally, despite the availability of detailed guidance from the NCSC and other sources, lay
advice and worst-practice is often shared among rms via social networks. The complexity of
systems and zero day vulnerabilities represent another serious threat.
2




Building on this SWOT analysis, we present a summary of the policy recommendations that
were made in the course of our interviews and workshops. These recommendations fall into
two broad areas. Firstly, they relate to the eectiveness of a centralised as opposed to a decen-
tralised approach to regulating cybersecurity, including assessments as to the most appropri-
ate regulatory instrument falling within each category. Table 2, below, provides a summary
of policy measures associated with each approach.
Centralised Approach Decentralised Approach
Standards Penetration Testing
Awareness & Education Data Anonymisation
Information Disclosure
Liability Rules
Consumer Control and Consent
Table 2: Overview of Regulatory Instruments
Secondly, they address the importance of regulatory interactions and the appropriate de-
gree of policy co-ordination between cybersecurity, data privacy and competition.
Interviews
All interviewees believed that more regulation and policy initiatives around cybersecurity and
data privacy are needed, and that current regulation needs to be updated. They diered in
terms of their precise ideas about which approaches to regulation would work best, however.
Concerning the desirability of a centralised vs. decentralised approach:
I1 Most stated that a centralised approach is more eective than a decentralised approach.
A small number mentioned that a decentralised approach may nonetheless be eec-
tive in raising awareness about security issues. One interviewee saw advantages and
disadvantages with both approaches, depending on the precise way in which they are
implemented.
I2 Some interviewees argued in favour of minimum security standards, for example self-
certication schemes (e.g. Cyber Essentials, Cyber Essentials Plus), the NIS Regulations
in relation to OESs and RDSPs, standards for digital payments infrastructure, the duty
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of care for nancial rms, and safety regulations for the Internet of Things and motor
vehicles.
I3 Most advocated for measures to increase consumer awareness, such as education about
security risks and training in the use of protective measures. One interviewee men-
tioned that cyber-awareness training, such as the NCSC’s Cyber Aware campaign, is a
useful way of promoting a wider understanding of the value of security.
I4 Some interviewees emphasised the importance of information disclosure. This relates
to the mandatory reporting of data breaches and vulnerabilities to regulators, but also
to information sharing regarding cybersecurity between dierent departments within
an organisation.
I5 Some highlighted the importance of consumer control and consent. The UK GDPR gives
consumers greater control of their data, but one interviewee mentioned that there is
excessive reliance on consumer consent as the legal basis for data processing.
I6 A small number mentioned liability rules and the diculties involved in clearly allocat-
ing liability for cyber-damages when they arise.
I7 A small number of interviewees emphasised consumer protection policies, for instance
ensuring that adequate mechanisms for redress are available to end users.
I8 In terms of data sharing, none of our interviewees remarked on any diculties among
small rms in accessing data from large, gatekeeper rms.
I9 To reduce the cognitive burden of regulations, one interviewee highlighted the potential
for regulation to become automated, though implementing this in practice would be
challenging. Relatedly, a small number of interviewees also mentioned that government
guidance needs to be easy to understand and simple to follow.
I10 In terms of the decentralised approach, most interviewees said that penetration testing
and ‘white hats’ are important because they help to identify vulnerabilities, induce re-
sponsible disclosure, and lead to better reporting incentives since private companies,
subject to reputational pressure, may have incentives to hide vulnerabilities. In gen-
eral, the eectiveness of penetration tests depends on company size and budget. Some
viewed anonymisation of data as useful, but only if it is done correctly. A small number
regarded full anonymisation as dicult and costly to achieve.
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Concerning regulatory interactions and policy co-ordination:
I11 All interviewees viewed cybersecurity and data privacy as interdependent but stated
that, in practice, they are often treated in isolation of one another. For example, cy-
bersecurity is often delegated to IT departments, while HR manages data retention and
disclosure. A small number of interviewees mentioned that this could be due to a lack
of awareness and understanding about security, and the fact that links between security
and privacy are not adequately reected in current regulations.
I12 Most interviewees thought that regulations need to be co-ordinated because (i) co-
ordination can help to close regulatory gaps and pool regulatory competencies, espe-
cially when, in the digital age, the nance, health, water, and energy sectors all confront
digital problems, (ii) a one-stop-shop would be especially useful for SMEs, which have
limited resources, although this can take a long time to set up, and (iii) unintended
side-eects caused by regulations targeted exclusively in one area can be costly.
I13 A small number of interviewees identied overlaps between regulations targeting cy-
bersecurity/data privacy and competition. One interviewee mentioned that access by
privileged rms to large volumes of data can create competition concerns but, on the
other hand, that competition may not work eectively if data is very fragmented.
I14 Most agreed that a rm’s cybersecurity and data privacy practices can give it a compet-
itive advantage over market rivals. A cyber-breach aects reputation negatively, while
having a cybersecurity badge or certicate and sound data protection policies generates
trust and positive reputational eects. Some stated that rms will adjust their security
and data privacy strategies in response to an increase in competition.
Workshops
In general, regulation was felt to be lacking, although the appropriate design of regulations
needs further investigation.
Concerning the desirability of alternative regulations:
W1 In broad terms, regulation can be eective in achieving greater security. To do so it
needs to alter rm incentives (as the GDPR did by increasing ne levels, for instance).
Changes to rm incentives brought about by regulation can explain important security
improvements, for example with respect to sim cards (preventing toll fraud), banking
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(preventing liability claims from depositors) and wi- connectivity (authentication en-
abled to prevent signal stealing).
W2 Digital security by design should not ignore the importance of the human factor. The
human factor is not only present in the form of the end-user, but integral to every level
of the security ecosystem. The human factor represents one reason why increasing
security is not always in rms’ private interests, since consumers may not be aware
of such improvements. Raising awareness among consumers is an important objective,
but security communications, informal security training and formal security education
must be eectively designed to meet that objective. For example, they should avoid a
one-size-ts-all approach and focus on the specic threats and vulnerabilities in each
specic context.
W3 Employee training and workplace culture are also important. Sta need to be trained
and work in a culture in which mistakes can be reported. SMEs in particular need to be
given support to understand and comply with regulations. Given appropriate training
and sta culture, the human factor can also become a strength in the security context.
Automation can be helpful in mitigating risks associated with the human factor. One
example of this is including the payee’s name in bank transfers.
W4 Certication schemes are an increasingly important driver of cybersecurity incentives.
These are a recognised means under the GDPR for rms to demonstrate compliance
with data protection regulations but, in general terms, their quality and independence
remains unclear. Certication is particularly important for smaller companies that are
not under close regulatory scrutiny. In that connection, SMEs account for the majority
of rms achieving Cyber Essentials certication. Only 13% of certied companies are
large.
W5 Disclosure matters, although it can be dicult to convey to customers that a rm is
actually regulated, since regulators (for example the FCA in the context of its CBEST
reviews) cannot disclose the outcome of its security reviews, because this would high-
light vulnerabilities.
W6 Independent oversight, as is required in connection with cyber-insurance for example,
can be an important tool to prevent security incidents being suppressed. In relation to
cyber-insurance, characterising cybersecurity risk is a major obstacle to wider adoption,
especially given the lack of historical data concerning risks in this area.
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W7 Liability rules can also be an important tool to alter rm incentives.
Concerning regulatory interactions and policy co-ordination:
W8 Competition has an important role to play. While most rms do not compete on the
strength of their cybersecurity, there are important exceptions (e.g. vendors of security
products, Apple, and banks).
W9 Competition also matters in connection with regulatory issues around cybersecurity
and data privacy because access to personal data is often concentrated in the hands of a
few ‘gatekeeper’ rms, who derive their dominant market position from the access they
have to consumer data. The EU Data Governance Act is a proposal to limit this market
power by preventing gatekeepers from storing or moving European data subjects’ data,
instead obliging them to access it via data trusts.
W10 Open Banking is another example of an attempt to limit the power of incumbent rms by
promoting data sharing. This aims to reduce switching costs, although there is limited
evidence that Open Banking has succeeded in this objective. On the other hand, security
has been robust under Open Banking thanks to the “whitelist” model operated by the
OB Implementation Entity, which owns and maintains the directory of OB participants.
W11 More broadly in the nancial services context, the usual know your client checks extend
beyond nancial concerns (counterparty risk, money laundering, etc.) to encompass
security checks. It is important to go beyond verifying that certication is current to
determine the actual security measures that are in place.
W12 New means of organising and sharing data present new challenges for cybersecurity
and data privacy regulation. From an individual data subject’s perspective, these means
include personal information management systems, personal online data stores and
privacy-enhancing technologies. From a collective perspective, they include data trusts
and data co-operatives.
W13 Given the importance of the human factor, there is signicant overlap between cyber-
security regulation and consumer protection. The ICO and CMA are working together
to develop a new norm of ‘fair by design’.
W14 Regulations and their enforcement need to be co-ordinated within rms, to take into
account disparities between new and legacy systems that might have been acquired via
26
mergers & acquisitions and nationally, to prevent a situation in which dierent regula-
tors provide conicting messages. Regulation also needs to keep pace with innovation
and not stick to a technologically outdated status quo.
3.4 Open Questions
In summary, our primary data analysis demonstrates that regulatory interactions, especially
those between cybersecurity and data privacy, matter in the eyes of market participants. De-
spite this, current regulations can lead to shortcomings in this respect, as security and privacy
decisions are often separated within rms. While the current regime of digital security reg-
ulation in the UK has several strengths, there are also important weaknesses, opportunities
and threats, in light of which it is important to consider what measures might be taken to
improve the regulatory framework.
A wide range of policy recommendations emerges from our primary data analysis. While
broadly in favour of a centralised approach, they are varied in terms of the importance they at-
tach to specic regulatory instruments falling within this approach. In order to determine the
most eective way of aligning rms’ incentives with society’s interests, we therefore require
an objective basis on which to evaluate these competing proposals.
Theoretical modelling work allows the welfare consequences of alternative regulations to
be studied in isolation of conating factors. We therefore move on to a review of the academic
literature and technical reports to summarise the existing state of knowledge in this area.
Thereafter, we present the results of two original pieces of research that directly address the
question of regulatory interactions in relation to cybersecurity.
Part 4
Literature Review
In this part, we review a number of technical reports on the question of cybersecurity incen-
tives and regulation (Part 4.1) before reviewing the academic literature in the area of cyber-
security and data privacy (Part 4.2).
4.1 Technical Reports
The reports we discuss below serve to highlight the importance that policy makers attach
to the question of economic incentives in the cybersecurity context, thereby underlining the
importance of this research agenda. They also give important insights into the approaches to
regulation currently favoured by policy makers.
UK
The 2020 Review of Cyber Security Incentives and Regulation (hereafter, ‘the Review’) invited
responses from industry participants in order to identify the major obstacles to greater digital
security adoption in the UK (see DCMS, 2020b).
1
In contrast to the previous Cyber Security
Regulation and Incentives Review (see DCMS, 2016), the latest Review was characterised by a
far greater focus on economic incentives in addition to technological capabilities. Lacking in-
centives were identied both by the Government in advance of the Review and by respondents
to the Review as one of the most signicant barriers to adoption.
2
1
The issue of incentives is also mentioned in connection with the question of trust in data ecosystems in
Open Data Institute (2021).
2
By comparison, the 2016 Review concluded that “additional cyber security regulation [...] is not currently
justied. It should ultimately be for organisations to manage their own risk in respect of their own sensitive data
and online presence, and it should be in their commercial interests to invest in their protection. Government
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“While we believe that Government initiatives to date have had a positive impact
on cyber security, these eorts have tended to focus on improving organisational
capability [...]. Less explicit focus has been placed on exploring and addressing
commercial rationales for investment in cyber security. [...] The ndings highlight
that a lack of commercial rationale is a signicant barrier for organisations, and was
identied to be an even more severe barrier for micro and small organisations.”
DCMS (2020b), emphasis added
Over 70% of respondents to the Review agreed that the lack of a commercial rationale
represented a moderate or severe barrier to rms managing cyber-risks. Moreover, the addi-
tional barriers that were mentioned by respondents both relate precisely to the question of
incentives and regulation. The rst of these was “a lack of incentives to support organisa-
tions to protect their organisation online”. The second, was “insucient regulation to compel
organisations to better manage cyber risks.”
A major obstacle to security incentives identied in the Review concerned information
about the harm of cyber-attacks, which 89% of respondents viewed as integral to decisions
about cyber-investments. Without clear information about the benets of cyber-investments,
their costs typically cannot be justied (this ties in with the threats identied in our qualita-
tive analysis). 10% of respondents stated that a lack of regulation was one factor preventing
greater access to information. Moreover, 45% thought that more regulation was needed to
increase senior management accountability for cyber risk management, which ties in with
our preceding discussion of liability rules.
In terms of Government responses, the Call for Evidence coincided with the launch of
the Cyber Aware campaign and the introduction by the NCSC of new guidance for rms.
These measures tie in with the issue of awareness discussed in Part 3.2 (see weaknesses).
Moreover, the Government has also recently launched a new cybersecurity funding scheme
for healthcare suppliers, see HM Government (2020). Of course, to the extent that inadequate
incentives are due to a lack of information rather than budget constraints, the eectiveness of
such funding may be limited. This relates back to the weaknesses discussed in Part 3.2, where
it was stated that oering self-certication schemes free of charge led to limited increases in
uptake among rms, which might be explained by a lack of awareness on their part.
Finally, the Review contains limited discussion of most of the regulations summarised in
Table 2 of this report. These will be analysed in more detail in Part 5, where we also argue that
is clear that all businesses have a responsibility to consider their own cyber security and act in their business
interests to protect themselves from cyber attack.” (DCMS, 2016, p11).
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a more prescriptive approach to regulation than is currently envisaged by the Government
may well be needed.
Internationally
In the US, the Department of Homeland Security has published a research strategy that high-
lights the principle objectives for economic research in the area of cybersecurity (see Depart-
ment of Homeland Security, 2018). Most of these tie in closely with the focus of this report,
not least Theme 2 (“Role of Government, Law, and Insurance”), Theme 3 (“Third Party Risk”),
Theme 4 (“Organizational Behavior and Incentives”) and Theme 5 (“Data Collection and Shar-
ing”).
Finally, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) provides
an overview of digital security threats and mitigation approaches in OECD (2021). As well as
describing the nature of various cyber-threats, the report also highlights the importance of
economic incentives:
“Many challenges to eective vulnerability treatment are economic in nature.
They include a lack of co-operation amongst stakeholders, limited market incen-
tives, legal barriers, and lack of resources and skills.”
(OECD, 2021, p.6), emphasis added
Incentives are particularly emphasised in connection with achieving the ideal ‘vulnerability
lifecycle’ (discovery, handling, management, disclosure), which ties in with several points
from our qualitative analysis (e.g. I4, W5).
4.2 Academic Literature
Cybersecurity
This section reviews the economics and management literatures on cybersecurity, which
mainly focus on the incentives to invest and the eciency of markets in providing such in-
centives. The security features of a given product can be seen as one factor determining that
product’s quality. We can therefore apply classic economic theories on quality competition,
such as Spence (1975) and Mussa and Rosen (1978), to analyse incentives and distortions from
the ecient market outcome caused by market power in the context of cybersecurity. How-
ever, rather than providing an exhaustive review of the vast literature on market power and
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regulation, the primary focus of this review is to survey the more recent literature relating to
specic issues of cybersecurity.
To start with, it is common for rms to invest in multiple alternatives to protect their IT
systems before and after a product launch. Lam (2016) studies multi-dimensional security
investments in preventing and mitigating the eects of cyber-attacks. She shows that when
IT users can undertake security measures to reduce the expected damage of cyber-attacks,
rms may underinvest in attack prevention early on but overinvest in damage control after
sales. Government interventions in the form of a security standard and a partial liability rule,
which does not hold the rm fully liable for cyber-damages, can be used to improve eciency
in cybersecurity investments, as these legal requirements oer incentives for rms to rely less
on bug xing investments after sales and to release a safer product in the rst place.
Much of the prior work on cybersecurity focuses on a single dimension of security in-
vestment, for example, on damage control or bug xing. If a vulnerability is discovered after
product launches, an important question is whether rms should disclose such information.
Some papers have debated the pros and cons of voluntary versus mandatory vulnerability
disclosure. In Choi et al. (2010), vulnerability disclosure along with the release of patches or
updates can help protect users who apply these updates. However, applying updates is costly
because of downtime that interferes with the current activities of users, the eort required to
download and install updates, and potential risks of system crashes brought about by the up-
dates. Therefore not all users are prepared to incur these costs and apply updates in a timely
manner. For these users, vulnerability disclosure may enable hackers to exploit the vulner-
ability and harm them. When users’ costs of installing the updates are suciently high, a
mandatory disclosure regulatory policy may be desirable.
When vulnerability disclosure does not coincide with the patch release time, Arora et al.
(2008) show that patch releases are excessively delayed because rms do not fully internalise
user damage when attackers exploit a known vulnerability. In these cases, it would be useful
for the regulator to consider shortening the notication period when it is legal for a rm to
keep a vulnerability secret.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the damages associated with a security breach are varied
and include the costs of preventing, detecting, and mitigating such breaches, revenue losses,
reputational damage, and legal liabilities. To quantify these costs, some research studies have
examined the impact of security information disclosures on stock market returns, albeit with
mixed results. Cavusoglu et al. (2004) nd that disclosure of a security breach has a signicant
negative eect on a rm’s stock price. However, Campbell et al. (2003) show that this eect
depends on the nature of the data that is compromised. Stock prices are likely to fall whenever
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a breach leaks condential information, but when condential information is not involved a
breach has no signicant eect on stock price. Using a dierent categorisation of breaches,
Gordon et al. (2011) show that dierent types of security breaches have dierent impacts on
stock market returns, with breaches related to denying authorised users access to services
having the most negative impact. Gordon et al. (2010) further consider voluntary disclosures
of proactive security measures and show that this has a positive eect on a rm’s market
value.
In an event study, Gordon et al. (2011) show that security breaches have become less costly
over time by comparing the costs of security breaches in the periods preceding and following
the September 11, 2001, attacks. A plausible explanation is that investors’ attitudes towards
security breaches have changed. As security breaches become more common, people tend to
become less concerned and view security breaches as a small nuisance rather than a serious
risk management issue. When investors and rms grow overly optimistic about what might
go wrong, it might be desirable for regulators to step in. In summary, whether information
disclosure increases or decreases rm value depends on what type of security information is
disclosed. Firms may also strategically disclose information to attract customers and investors,
leading to an increase in rm value. For a recent review of event studies, see Spanos and
Angelis (2016).
Firms may also decide to share security information among themselves. Gal-Or and Ghose
(2005) show that an increase in security investments or information sharing by one rm will
induce other rms to increase their security investments and information sharing. Information-
sharing alliances that promote disclosure and sharing of security vulnerabilities, security best-
practices, and technological solutions (such as the Information Sharing and Analysis Centres
in the US) are more valuable in more competitive industries, where rms strategically share
information and increase security investments to reduce the intensity of price competition
with rivals.
On the issue of user incentives, Varian (2004) considers security investments as a public
good, since the security of the whole system depends on the investments of individuals in the
team. He shows that system reliability depends on whether protection levels are determined
by the eorts of the most careless defender, the best defender or all defenders. Accordingly,
a rm could improve protection levels by strategically adjusting its IT hiring decisions (e.g.
hiring fewer but better sta, hiring only the best, or prioritising quantity of sta over quality).
August and Tunay (2006) consider the incentives of users to patch security vulnerabilities in
the presence of patching costs and negative security externalities. The unpatched users exert
negative externalities on patched users since, if a user fails to install patches, they will harm
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other users by increasing the level of risk they are exposed to. Their results indicate that when
security risk and patching costs are high, a subsidy on patching (e.g. a reward to encourage
timely patching) is better than mandatory patching.
Furthermore, network structure can strongly inuence investment incentives. Acemoglu
et al. (2016) examine a model of security investments in a network where attacks are conta-
gious. In the case of strategic attacks, that is when an attacker can target a particular rm,
overinvestment may emerge because larger security investments shift attacks to other rms.
Closely related is a large literature on network games (see Jackson and Zenou, 2015, for a
thorough review). These models can be applied to various settings, such as a network of
players/rms undertaking investments against a cyber-attack, a nancial risk or an infectious
disease.
Data Privacy
The literature on data privacy is very rich, dating back to the 1970s (see seminal writings of
researchers such as Richard Posner and George Stigler), but an exhaustive review is beyond
the scope of this report. The main focus of the more recent literature is on the sharing of
customer information between rms and information disclosure by consumers. For example,
Calzolari and Pavan (2006) show that the exchange of information between two rms that
are interested in discovering consumers’ willingness to pay may, in some cases, induce more
ecient information use and benet both rms and consumers.
In Taylor (2004), a rm selling a product in early periods can sell customer data to a rm
that sells a related product in a later period, which allows the second rm to infer consumers’
preferences and engage in price discrimination. For example, if a consumer purchased from
the rst rm, then the second rm can infer that the valuation of that customer is higher than
if the consumer did not make the purchase. If consumers are savvy, in the sense that they
are able to anticipate that disclosing information will reduce their future surplus and there-
fore strategically withhold such information, then it is in rms’ best interest to implement
their own privacy protection policies, even without any government regulation that prohibits
information sharing.
In a related set-up, Argenziano and Bonatti (2021) study the impact of dierent forms of
privacy regulations, such as transparency, consent, and limits to discrimination. They show
that voluntary consent is benecial to consumers but that a ban on discriminatory oers is
harmful. This is because, under voluntary consent, consumers can veto data sharing between
rms, and rms can adjust their terms of trade (quality level and price) based on consumers’
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consent decisions. Thus, data sharing happens whenever it is mutually benecial for both
consumers and rms. However, under the right to equal service, rms cannot adjust their
terms of trade in response to consumers’ strategic information disclosure. As a consequence,
limits to discrimination may result in consumers consenting to harmful data sharing practices,
even if they would have refused to share their data when discriminatory oers are possible.
With recent advancements in consumer tracking technologies, rms can build a precise
prole and oer personalised products, prices or ads to consumers, but the collection and us-
age of consumer information may raise privacy concerns. This has led to a urry of research
on the interplay between privacy considerations and enhanced personalisation. For instance,
Gal-Or et al. (2018) examine the eect of privacy concerns on competition between online
advertising platforms, such as Facebook and Google, who collect consumer information for
the purpose of making ads more relevant. In their model, consumers’ and advertisers’ prefer-
ences for targeting are heterogeneous: some consumers are more sensitive to data collection
and are therefore more averse to targeted advertising, while other consumers prefer to view
more relevant ads. Firms that focus on a niche market can benet more from high levels of
targeting than rms that sell products that have a broad appeal. The presence of such hetero-
geneity in preferences for targeting on the demand side leads platforms to dierentiate the
targeting levels they oer to advertisers, which in turn inuences the oers received by the
consumers. The platform that oers the higher targeting level ends up with larger market
shares in both the ad and the product markets, which allows it to charge higher prices and
earn higher prots. On the other hand, smaller platforms oer more privacy to consumers in
order to dierentiate themselves from their competitors.
Further up the supply chain, we observe data brokers (e.g., Acxiom, Datalogix, and Nielsen)
aggregating data from dierent sources, and selling information to rms for price discrimi-
nation purposes. They can inuence downstream competition by controlling access to infor-
mation. When data brokers can only sell either all available information on consumers or no
information at all (i.e., they cannot sell a subset of information), Montes et al. (2019) show
that a data broker has incentives to sell information exclusively to one rm. With only one
of the competing rms able to set personalised prices, price competition is less intense in the
product market.
However, when data brokers can sell a subset of information to downstream rms (e.g.,
large versus smaller datasets, and more precise versus less precise proles), Belleamme et al.
(2020) show that a data broker has incentives to sell datasets of dierent qualities to down-
stream rms in a non-exclusive manner, as rms ending up with dierent abilities to prole
consumers can soften price competition in the product market and, hence, increase the rms’
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willingness to pay for the data brokers’ services.
Data brokers may also transact and exchange information with each other (see Federal
Trade Commission, 2014). Gu et al. (2020) show that data brokers have incentives to share
information with each other when datasets contain overlapping information or data points
are correlated, as information sharing avoids erce price competition between data brokers.
Ichihashi (2020) studies a monopolist who uses information about consumers for both
product matching and pricing purposes. He shows that, in some cases, the rm prefers not to
use information for pricing in order to incentivise information disclosure by consumers, but
such a strategy hurts consumers due to potential product mismatch.
Empirical studies investigating the need for data privacy regulations provide mixed re-
sults. In a eld study, Goldfarb and Tucker (2011a) provide empirical evidence that overly
precise proling can trigger a negative response from consumers due to privacy concerns.
However, other empirical studies caution that privacy regulations, despite their positive in-
tentions, may reduce ad eectiveness. For example, Goldfarb and Tucker (2011b) nd that,
after the implementation of the EU e-Privacy Directive, advertising eectiveness of internet
banner ads in Europe decreased signicantly on average. However, not all advertising was
aected equally. The loss in eectiveness is more pronounced for ads on general-interest
websites (such as news and games) compared to ads on niche websites (such as health and
automotive). The consequence might be a higher price charged to the consumers for access to
content or a change in the mix of content. First, as advertisers become less willing to pay for
less eective ads and content providers earn less from the advertisers, platforms may charge
a higher price to consumers in order to recoup lost revenues on the advertisers’ side. Sec-
ond, as niche content becomes more protable relative to general-interest content, content
may become more narrowly focused. Therefore, privacy regulation can be seen as a trade-o
between the benets of consumer privacy on the one hand, and the costs of reduced ad and
content relevance and higher prices on the other.
Overall, topics related to data can be very diverse, For more general discussion, we refer
interested readers to excellent surveys of the economic literature on privacy and data markets
by Acquisti et al. (2016) and Bergemann and Bonatti (2019).
4.3 Open Questions
This literature review emphasises the importance that governments and international organ-
isations attach to the question of economic incentives in the context of cybersecurity reg-
ulation. Moreover, the discussion of the academic literature highlights the insights that a
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theoretical investigation of cybersecurity and data privacy can bring.
Despite the variety of approaches to studying regulation in these areas, what is notable
about the academic literature is that it considers security and privacy questions in isolation
of one another. One example of a paper that does touch on both security and privacy simulta-
neously is Jullien et al. (2020). However, this work does not clearly distinguish between these
concepts. In particular, Jullien et al. (2020) analyse a monopolist platform’s optimal privacy
policy when it monetises information collected from consumers by charging third parties for
access. The platform’s privacy policy can be interpreted as a precautionary ‘investment’ that
screens third parties and limits third party access in order to protect consumer data from at-
tacks. Therefore this notion of investment encompasses both cybersecurity and data privacy.
3
The principle open question emerging from this review is therefore the following: what
implications does the clear logical separation of cybersecurity and data privacy have for the
design of optimal cybersecurity policies once we allow for rms’ incentives in these dimen-
sions to be interrelated? In Part 5, we discuss two original contributions that investigate this
question, and which further allow us to contrast the outcomes arising in monopolistic and
competitive market settings. We also relate the conclusions of this research back to the pri-
mary evidence summarised in the qualitative analysis of Part 3.
3
In this model, data collection may lower the quality of the consumer experience, for example when third
parties expose consumers to data leaks, theft or extortion. Consumers have limited or no awareness about these
potential cyber-risks when dealing with third parties. While a higher level of privacy/cybersecurity protects
consumers from cyber-risks, it limits their opportunities to learn about their vulnerability to attacks and to
enjoy benecial matches with third parties.
Part 5
Theoretical Results & Evidence
In this part we discuss two original contributions that extend the academic literature by ad-
dressing directly the question of regulatory interactions. Part 5.1 discusses interactions be-
tween cybersecurity and data privacy. Part 5.2 discusses the role of competition.
5.1 Interactions between Cybersecurity & Data Privacy
As motivated in the Introduction, both cybersecurity and data privacy can be understood in
terms of the dissemination of consumer data through the economy. This occurs intentionally
when a data controlling rm decides to share data with a third party, and unintentionally
when hackers succeed in overcoming the controller’s cyber-defences.
Our primary data analysis in Part 3 highlights the fact that market participants consider
interactions between security and privacy to be important (I11, I12). From Part 2 we know that,
in the existing UK framework of regulations, these interactions are taken into account in a
rather limited sense. In particular, the UK GDPR and DPA 2018 rely on a rm’s assessment as
to the appropriate level of security given its data processing (data sharing) activities.
In order to study the interactions between security and privacy in more detail and to derive
regulatory implications, Lam and Seifert (2021a) develop a model that clearly distinguishes













Figure 2: Model Schematic – Cybersecurity & Data Privacy
The strategic actor in this model is the data controller, which faces a threefold decision
problem. Firstly, it decides on the price to charge consumers for access to its product or
service, and any consumer who purchases the product simultaneously hands over a volume
of personal data to the controller.
1
Secondly, the data controller then decides whether or not
to share this data with a third party. This third party is willing to pay for data access because
it provides its own service to consumers, the value of which is increased if it has access to
the data collected by the controller.
2
Finally, the data controller also determines the level of
its investment in cybersecurity, with higher levels of security investment leading to a lower
probability of a harmful hack occurring.
The only consumers who will purchase the product oered by the data controller will be
those attaching a suciently high value to it. In particular, this valuation must be high enough
to oset not only the purchase price, but also any residual cyber-damages that consumers
anticipate in the future. This residual liability for cyber-damages on the part of consumers
arises because, when data is shared with the third party, a successful hack on the controller
leads to a possible follow-on attack on the third party and, in the baseline model, consumers
are liable for damages arising from such follow-on attacks.
3
In this regard, the model further distinguishes between savvy and non-savvy consumers.
This allows us to separate (savvy) consumers who are able to factor data-related risks into
their decision to interact with the data controller from (non-savvy) consumers who disregard
1
This data may capture name, address, and other details required by the data controller, or information that
is collected passively via browser cookies.
2
The reasons for which this might occur include product customisation and price targeting, for example
(McKinsey & Company, 2016).
3
This ties in with point I12 in Part 3.3, for example, relating to the diculty of holding rms liable for cyber-
damages. Intuitively, the more widely data is shared, the more points of attack there are for hackers to target.
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cyber-risks. In this way, we capture the observed tendency of signicant proportions of the
consumer population to disregard data risks in their decision making.
4
Business Implications
Since regulations exist in order to bring private incentives into line with societal goals, a rst
important question concerns the interactions between a rm’s cybersecurity and data privacy
(data sharing) choices. If these are interdependent, regulations targeting one or other of these
areas must take the interrelated nature of rms’ incentives into account.
In this regard, we show that a prot maximising data controller will tend to increase its
security investment when sharing data with the third party. In particular, we have:
Result 1: Provided the damage caused by a data breach is not too large, prot maximisation
implies that rms will invest more in cybersecurity when they share data with a third party.
This relationship between security and privacy arises as the balance of several conicting
eects. Whenever the damage of any individual data breach is not too large,
5
the overall result
goes in the same direction as the demand responsiveness eect. This describes the fact that, as
soon as data is shared, the demand for the data controller’s product becomes responsive to the
chosen level of cybersecurity because savvy consumers anticipate that, the lower the level of
security, the greater the likelihood with which they will incur damages as a result of follow-
on attacks in future. This incentivises the controller to invest more in security when data is
shared in order to retain a greater share of its demand originating from savvy consumers.
This also supports the GDPR’s notion of appropriateness, according to which more risky
data processing activities, reected here in the controller’s decision to share data with the third
party, should be accompanied by higher levels of security. Nonetheless, we explain below that
regulation is still needed in order to tackle market failures relating to both cybersecurity and
data privacy.
Regulatory Implications
Regulation is needed in this market because, despite the broad relationship between cyber-
security and data privacy described above, important market failures remain with respect to
both. Firstly, we have:
4
Recall footnote 1 in Part 3.
5
The relevant condition is satised for the majority of cyber-breaches, see Mann (2015, pp. 321-322).
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Result 2: Firms under-invest in cybersecurity.
Under-investment occurs because of a divergence between the data controller’s and soci-
ety’s objectives. The rm’s concern for its margin leads it to increase prices above the level
that society would choose, since society is more concerned with ensuring that consumers have
access to the product or service oered by the rm. With a higher price, and the associated
lower demand, the incentive to invest in security falls.
This ties in with the evidence discussed as part of the threats in our primary data analysis,
in particular the low levels of operational expenditure that is typically allocated to cyberse-
curity.
The second market failure relates to the rm’s data sharing decisions.
Result 3: Firms tend to over-share data.
The reason for this result goes back to the presence of non-savvy consumers in the popu-
lation. Since these consumers do not respond to the increased cyber-risks that accompany the
data controller’s decision to share data, the rm exploits the presence of non-savvy consumers
by sharing data too frequently. Society takes all cyber-damages into account, irrespective of
whether they are anticipated by consumers or not.
While direct evidence on the tendency of data controlling rms to share data is dicult
to obtain, this relates to point I8, according to which no diculties in obtaining data from
gatekeeper rms were reported by our interviewees.
In correcting these market failures, it is of course vital to select the most appropriate of
a wide range of possible instruments (see Table 2). By considering, in particular, minimum
security standards, disclosure and consumer education policies, liability rules, and consumer
mitigation strategies, we demonstrate below that evaluating the welfare impact of alternative
regulations requires the interactions between cybersecurity and data privacy to be taken into
account.
(i) Minimum standard on security. A rst potential solution to the under-investment prob-
lem lies in the imposition of a minimum security standard, which stipulates a minimum
level of security that rms must implement. These have already been discussed in the
context of our primary data analysis (I2, W4). We are able to show analytically that,
holding xed the rm’s data sharing decision, implementing a minimum security stan-
dard improves social welfare when it causes the rm to increase its investments above
the level they would otherwise have chosen. However, the rm’s data sharing decision
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typically cannot be held xed in practice. We show that, allowing for prot maximising
data sharing choices on the part of the data controller, increasing the level of the se-
curity standard can have unintended social welfare consequences when it induces the
rm to share data ineciently. Determining whether or not minimum standards are
an eective solution to the under-investment problem therefore rests crucially on the
impact they simultaneously exert on a rm’s decision to share data.
(ii) Disclosure and consumer education policies. Disclosure and consumer education poli-
cies were discussed extensively in our interviews and workshops (e.g. I3, I4, W2, W5).
We are able to capture the eects of disclosure and consumer education policies in the
model by associating them with an increase in the fraction of savvy consumers. We
again demonstrate the crucial importance of regulatory interactions. While the rm’s
security investments rise as the fraction of sophisticated consumers increases, total de-
mand in the economy simultaneously falls because more consumers decide to withhold
data in the face of data risks. Consumer policies may have unintended consequences
on welfare, unless the increase in savvy consumers deters the rm from sharing data
at all. In that case, welfare increases because the risk of follow-on attacks is eliminated
entirely. Again, the welfare properties of this class of regulation rest crucially on the
interactions between cybersecurity and data privacy.
(iii) Stricter liability rules. Liability rules were also covered during our interviews and work-
shops (I6, W7). We can study the eect of stricter liability rules by supposing that the
data controller is liable for cyber-damages, irrespective of whether they arise from an
attack on the controller itself or on the third party. We show that welfare is lower under
such a full liability rule when the rm would share data, regardless of which liability rule
is implemented. This is the case because the rm internalises follow-on cyber-attacks
under the full liability rule by setting a higher price, and the associated drop in demand
is not suciently oset by increases in security investment. On the other hand, the
rm is less likely to share data under full liability, since it is now liable for the harm of
follow-on attacks, and, when the full liability rule causes the rm to stop sharing data,
welfare can again increase because the risk of follow-on attacks is eliminated.
(iv) Consumer mitigation strategies. A nal regulatory approach that we study in the model
encompasses consumer mitigation strategies. These capture methods, such as changing
passwords, spending time to monitor user accounts, and using private browsing modes
and ad blockers, by which consumers can themselves reduce the extent of the damage
they suer as a result of a cyber-attack. This ties in with the ideas of empowering
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consumers in digital markets contained in I5, I7 and W12. We nd that giving consumers
the means to reduce the extent of the damages they suer in case of a successful hack
crowds out the security investments made by the data controller. Oering consumers
more mitigation options may have unintended consequences, especially when the drop
in the rm’s investments is not adequately oset by consumers’ mitigation eorts.
This analysis highlights the fact that many of the policy recommendations made in the
course of our primary data collection exercise represent only partial solutions to market fail-
ures in the area of cybersecurity. Whenever unilateral regulations exert unintended eects
on welfare, a co-ordinated approach to regulation, which simultaneously considers rm’s
data sharing incentives, is needed. This will likely need to go beyond the more limited co-
ordination currently reected in the UK GDPR (see Part 2.4). In particular, while there is some
evidence that the GDPR has increased cybersecurity investments (see RSM UK Consulting,
2020), we show that rms nonetheless face insucient incentives in this regard.
This suggests that a more prescriptive approach is needed. Such an approach would need
to set out not only the limits within which rms may lawfully share data, but also specify more
directly the required security precautions that must accompany specic types of data sharing,
rather than relying on rms to make their own decisions in this regard. More broadly, any
regulatory approach in this area must appropriately balance rms’ interdependent decisions
regarding cybersecurity and data privacy.
5.2 The Eect of Competition
Our second theoretical contribution extends the above analysis to consider the eect of com-
petition. This is an important innovation if we wish to analyse the impact of Open Bank-
ing (see W10) and related initiatives, which take a data-driven approach to increasing market
competition. More broadly, interactions between cybersecurity and competition were also
highlighted as important by several of our interviewees and workshop participants (see, in
particular, I13, I14, W9, W10).
Open Banking was introduced following the CMA Retail Banking Market Investigation
in 2017. Rather than breaking up the small number of banks that occupy a dominant market
position in the UK, this remedy sought to promote competition by encouraging data sharing
between incumbent banks and third parties, thereby reducing the costs of switching providers.
Discussions are already taking place around proposals to extend Open Banking beyond trans-
action data from bank accounts and payment services to include mortgage, savings, pensions,
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insurance and consumer credit products (“Open Finance”), and to other sectors besides nan-
cial services, particularly communications and energy (“Smart Data”).
6
Evaluating the consequences of any of these data-focused means of promoting competi-
tion must consider their eects on cybersecurity and data privacy. To that end, Lam and Seifert
(2021b) develop a model to investigate whether or not increasing competition improves wel-
fare once the interactions between rms’ cybersecurity and data sharing choices are taken
into account.
This model is based on the Hotelling framework of horizontal product dierentiation
(Belleamme and Peitz, 2015). In this set-up, a market of a xed size is envisaged as an interval
or line comprising all possible locations at which consumers seeking to purchase a product or
rms looking to sell might be located. These locations and, in particular, the distance between
a given consumer and its nearest rm can be understood in terms of both geography (think,
for example, of the distinction between city-centre vs. out-of-town shops) or distances in the
space of product characteristics. The latter is the more general interpretation, and considers
a consumer’s location to indicate their preferred product type. The closer a rm is to a given
consumer’s location, the smaller the departure from their ideal product type that the con-
sumer has to make when it purchases from the rm. Increasing competition by increasing the
number of rms in the market is benecial because it reduces the extent to which consumers
have to depart from their ideal product characteristics when making a purchase.
Indeed, we capture the eect of enforced data sharing via Open Banking and related mea-
sures by associating them with a shift in the market structure from a single-rm monopoly to
a two-rm duopoly. The distinction between these market structures in terms of total travel
costs, to be understood in terms of the cumulative cost to consumers of having to purchase a



























Figure 3: Total Travel Costs (shaded grey)
6
See, respectively, the responses to the FCA’s Call for Input at https://www.fca.org.uk/news/news-stories/ fca-
publishes-feedback-call-input-open-nance and the Spring 2021 Report of the Smart Data Working Group at https:
//www.gov.uk/government/publications/ smart-data-working-group-spring-2021-report. Relatedly, the Centre for
Data Ethics and In ovation (CDEI) has been considering the potential benets of facilitating the more widespread
sharing of anonymised public sector data, see CDEI (2020).
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However, the eect of an increase in variety has to be balanced against potential costs
arising from security and data sharing. Regardless of the number of rms that operate in the
market, each rm faces a decision as to (i) how much to invest in order to protect consumer
data from cyber-attacks, and (ii) whether or not to share data with a common third party.
The precise assumptions regarding cybersecurity and data privacy parallel those in Lam and
Seifert (2021a).
A rst result concerns the choices a monopolist would make with respect to cybersecurity
and data privacy. In this regard, we have:
Result 4: In the monopoly benchmark, the rm’s cybersecurity and data sharing choices
coincide with the social optimum.
This diers notably from the conclusions drawn about the monopolistic data controller
in Lam and Seifert (2021a), see above. The reason for this distinction is that, in the present
model, the market is assumed to be saturated, in the sense that consumers view the product
being sold as essential, so that every consumer will end up purchasing one unit of the product
in equilibrium.
7
This diers from Lam and Seifert (2021a), where the rm’s pricing decisions
always lead to some consumers being excluded from the market. The reduction in demand
that goes along with the rm’s more aggressive pricing strategy was one important factor in
explaining the market failures in Lam and Seifert (2021a), which is absent in this model.
We contrast this result with the cybersecurity and data privacy outcomes arising under
competition. In that case, we have:
Result 5: In the competitive market setting, rms’ cybersecurity investments:
(i) coincide with the social optimum if rms’ data sharing choices are symmetric
(either both share or neither does), but
(ii) diverge from the social optimum if rms’ data sharing choices are asymmetric
(only one rm shares).
The reasons for which the rms’ privately optimal choices depart from the socially optimal
ones again relate to price and associated demand eects. In particular, when only one rm is
sharing, the rms’ freely chosen prices lead to an ineciently large portion of demand being
allocated to the rm that does not share. Thus, overall security investments are lower.
8
7
This is appropriate given the nature of the products (e.g. banking and utility services) that we consider here.
8
In this model, we assume that rms are fully liable for cyber-damages.
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It follows that a move to competition can introduce new cybersecurity and data privacy
market failures that do not arise under monopoly. They do so when an asymmetric data shar-
ing outcome is socially optimal, which occurs when neither rm sharing would excessively
limit the benets of data sharing, while both rms sharing would lead to an excessively high
risk of cyber-attacks.
It is consequently vital that Open Banking and related initiatives are co-ordinated with
suitable measures on the cybersecurity side. While advice about ensuring appropriate secu-
rity under Open Banking has been provided,
9
and in keeping with the advice put forward in
Part 5.1, a more prescriptive approach that more closely denes the security precautions that
must accompany involvement in the Open Banking ecosystem may therefore be needed. Cy-
bersecurity needs to be placed at the centre of data-driven initiatives to promote competition.
Finally, while Lam and Seifert (2021b) develop initial results concerning the interactions
between cybersecurity, data privacy and competition, it also remains to study the extent to
which these results can be applied to other sectors that face a distinct yet closely related set
of regulations to Open Banking, such as energy and telecommunications in light of the Smart
Data initiative.
5.3 Open Questions
This part has demonstrated the importance that regulatory interactions play in designing
optimal cybersecurity policies. In Part 5.1, we show that market failures relating to secu-
rity investment cannot be resolved in isolation of a rm’s data sharing choices. In Part 5.2, we
demonstrate that promoting a more competitive market structure in digital markets can intro-
duce new market failures in relation to cybersecurity. Consequently, cybersecurity needs to be
integral to any regulatory initiatives that seek to promote competition by enforced data shar-
ing. These theoretical results support the feedback received from interviewees and workshop
participants concerning the importance of regulatory interactions (I11–I14, W8–W14). They
also go some way towards improving our understanding of the welfare-desirability of some
of the regulatory instruments discussed in Part 3.
In combination with the open questions raised in Parts 2.4, 3.4 and 4.3, a number of impor-
tant questions remain unanswered, however. We present an overview of several important






This part ties together the open questions identied in the overview of existing UK legislation,
our primary data analysis, the literature review and our theoretical analysis in order to identify
several important directions for future research. The rst set of open questions, discussed in
Part 2.4, concerned the extent to which regulatory interactions are already accounted for
in the UK framework of cybersecurity regulation. In this regard, our qualitative analysis in
Part 3.3 conrms the importance of regulatory interactions in practice, while our theoretical
results in Parts 5.1 and 5.2 suggest that (i) a more prescriptive approach to cybersecurity than
that currently reected in the UK GDPR may be needed in order to ensure that cybersecurity
and data privacy are suciently co-ordinated, and (ii) any data-centred initiatives to promote
competition similarly need to incorporate appropriate cybersecurity measures.
In terms of the open questions raised by our primary data analysis, see Part 3.4, our theo-
retical results provide some guidance as to the properties of alternative regulatory instruments
that fall under the centralised approach. These results also address the principal open ques-
tion emerging from our literature review, see Part 4.3, insofar as they consider analytically
for the rst time the question of regulatory interactions in evaluating the welfare-desirability
of alternative cybersecurity policies. Important questions that remain to be explored include
the following.
6.1 Welfare Properties of the Decentralised Approach
The majority of research into incentives and regulation in the area of cybersecurity has fo-
cused on measures falling under the centralised approach, see Table 2. It is equally important




One particular understudied issue in this regard concerns the incentives of hackers, who
do not feature as strategic actors in most economic models, in which cyber-threats are instead
captured in an exogenous probability of attack. While hacker motivations have been discussed
elsewhere in the cybersecurity literature (e.g. Barber, 2001; Caldwell, 2011), these issues are
understudied in economic research. Accurately accounting for the motivations and incentives
of hackers is an important step towards a complete modelling of the cybersecurity ecosystem.
The problem that ethical hackers may not receive adequate protection from legal systems is
also raised in OECD (2021).
6.2 Behavioural Economics
A lack of awareness among individual consumers and employees about cyber-risks was high-
lighted as one of the most prominent weaknesses in the current regime of cybersecurity reg-
ulation. This issue is also integral to the theoretical modelling that we discuss in Part 5. In
Lam and Seifert (2021a), for example, the tendency for the data controller to share data too
frequently, thereby introducing an excessively high risk of follow-on attacks into the econ-
omy, was driven by the presence of non-savvy consumers in the market, who do not factor
cyber-risks into their decision making.
While this reects an important element of bounded rationality underlying consumer be-
haviour in digital markets, it would be very interesting to introduce a more explicit modelling
of consumers’ behavioural decision making into the analysis. This approach would more di-
rectly account for a variety of heuristics and rules of thumb that, beyond a lack of awareness,
can skew consumers’ decisions away from the full rationality benchmark. These issues have
already been highlighted in related settings where consumers face complex decision prob-
lems,
1
but have so far not been extensively investigated from a behavioural economic per-
spective in the cybersecurity context. One important example of relevant work in this area is
Lam and Lyons (2020), who explore the eect that GDPR-style opt-in regulation has on rm
incentives to invest in both product quality and data security.
6.3 Interactions with Consumer Policy
As motivated in the Introduction, as well as posing challenges for data security and privacy,
the extensive collection and usage of personal data can cause competition concerns. These
1
For example, the rst Occasional Paper published by the FCA concerned a range of behavioural biases that
aect consumer decisions in nancial markets. See Erta et al. (2013).
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issues can potentially be worsened by weak consumer protection rules, under which con-
sumers make poor choices. The recent Yale Tobin Center Report by Crawford et al. (2021)
presents a list of features of online markets that dierentiate them from oine environments,
and discusses whether we need tighter consumer protection rules for online markets to func-
tion well. In particular, the report mentions the greater collection and use of personal data as
a key feature, and recommends standardising ways of presenting privacy policies and options
for consumer control. This relates to the discussion in Lam and Seifert (2021a) on awareness,
disclosure and consumer mitigation. However, with each of these two papers having a sep-
arate focus (one on consumer policy, the other on cybersecurity), there is signicant scope
for future research to unite these separate strands by considering more fully the interactions
between cybersecurity, data privacy and consumer policy.
6.4 International Co-operation
The issue of international co-operation was highlighted in the context of the opportunities
discussed in Part 3.2 and is also mentioned in OECD (2021). While implementing appropriate
cybersecurity policies is challenging in a national context, particularly in light of the impor-
tant regulatory interactions we have highlighted throughout this report, the international
nature of cyber-threats has not been touched on so far. This raises a number of issues in rela-
tion to the enforcement of cybersecurity laws, not least because these laws may not exert the
desired deterrent eect on threats located outside of a country’s jurisdiction.
Moreover, delays in pursuing cyber-criminals across national borders were highlighted
as a threat by our interview participants. The diculties in aligning data-related policies in-
ternationally have also been made clear by the legal challenges on privacy grounds to the
EU-US Privacy Shield. While the harmonisation of regulations internationally has received
widespread attention in connection with environmental, tax and banking regulation, among
others, this question has not been studied from an economic perspective in the cybersecurity
context. Doing so introduces new incentive considerations in relation to competing govern-
ments’ objectives, as part of which the stringency of cybersecurity policies may be traded o
against promoting the competitiveness of the economy and attracting inward investment.
6.5 Autonomous Systems & AI
The nal open area of research that we highlight here relates to the opportunity for automa-
tion and AI technologies to play a greater role in cybersecurity regulation. The topic of AI has
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been receiving growing interest from economists, for example in the context of algorithmic
collusion (see, e.g., Calvano et al., 2020). The potential for AI to play a more positive role in
the context of cybersecurity regulation remains unexplored. Preliminary work around the
ethical issues surrounding the introduction of AI technologies to cybersecurity regulation is
contained in GCHQ (2021), which, in keeping with the feedback we received from intervie-
wees, highlights that these solutions must take account of possible “[u]nintended negative
consequences” (GCHQ, 2021, p.27) when AI is used as regulatory tool. The nature of these
negative consequences and the impact of AI on relevant incentives remain to be explored.
Part 7
Conclusion
This report studies the optimal design of cybersecurity policies with a specic focus on the
eect of regulatory interactions between cybersecurity, data privacy and competition. We
demonstrate that the existing UK framework of digital security regulation does take interac-
tions between cybersecurity and data privacy into account to some extent, as reected in the
“appropriateness” criterion underlying the UK GDPR and DPA 2018. This requires rms to im-
plement security measures that are appropriate to the risk of their data sharing (data process-
ing) activities. Competition is not directly reected in cybersecurity regulations, highlighting
the scope for closer integration between security and competition objectives.
The input gathered from interview and workshop participants supports the view that reg-
ulatory interactions matter. All interviews conrmed that cybersecurity and data privacy
should be seen as interdependent, and a smaller number identied overlaps between security
and competition. The policy recommendations gathered from these interviews and work-
shops concerned a wide range of regulatory instruments, but broadly supported a centralised
approach to cybersecurity regulation.
In order to evaluate the desirability of alternative regulatory approaches, we reviewed the
existing academic literature and technical reports in the area of cybersecurity regulation, and
also presented the results of two original pieces of theoretical work. These results highlight
the importance of regulatory interactions by demonstrating that unilateral regulations tar-
geting cybersecurity can, in some cases, have unintended consequences if rms’ data sharing
decisions are left to be determined by market forces. Concerning the eect of competition, we
show that data-driven measures to promote competition, such as Open Banking and Smart
Data, can introduce new market failures in the area of cybersecurity.
These results suggest that the degree of policy co-ordination between cybersecurity and
data privacy currently reected in the UK system of regulations might need to be strength-
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ened. Allowing rms to implement security measures that they deem appropriate in the face
of market forces may not be sucient. Instead, a more co-ordinated approach that more
closely prescribes the security measures that must accompany specic types of data sharing
is needed. On the competition side, our results highlight the need for cybersecurity consider-
ations to be integral to any competition remedy that relies on enforced data sharing.
While our theoretical analysis is the rst to account explicitly for the importance of regu-
latory interactions in the design of cybersecurity policies, many important questions remain
unanswered in this area. These concern, for example, the precise way in which cybersecurity,
data privacy and competition policies should be co-ordinated. Another important objective
for research concerns the behavioural nature of consumers’ decision-making, whose choices
may be more likely to be governed by various heuristics and rules of thumb than by fully
rational utility maximisation. While some aspects of this bounded rationality are reected in
our work, there are many more detailed questions to be addressed through the application of
behavioural economic analysis to the study of optimal cybersecurity policies.
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